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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR A . J .  AYER 
by 
RICHARD TAYLOR 
The three te1 m�. 11111<>r. prfrllt<· and m<·ntol recm 111 Sir .'\ l rred's dis.­
cuss ion. I believe it is fau to say that. in the context of lus �per. a l l  
three are used interchangeably. Ttns is where a l l  the troub�e hej!ms. 
Thus, with reference to that �rllcular feelin,.; referred to as a tweak , 
which 1 feel when mv shoe pinch�s (p.133). I am sure Sir Alfred would 
say it fs prwu te (meaning that It c;m be fell by no one hut me), that lt lS 
an ;nner state {meaning tha!I: lt cannot be observed by others the way, e.g .. 
rashes and twitches can be ohserved), and that tt ts 11w n1ul (meu.mn�. 
God knows what, other than that n lS uot phys ical). 
Now it appears to be Sir Alfrecl's view thal tf a stute of a �rson. or 
hiis foot, is ia the se11se private, then ar is ipso J'uciu both inner and 
mental; that any such inner stat.e is, ipso {acrti. hoth me11t.al and private: 
and that any mental state as, l ikewise . both inner and private, His criti­
cism of Ryle's"phllosophy appears to rest largely on the interchange­
ability or lhese three undefmed terms. 
Thus, it being apparent that Ryle does quite clearly repudiate iiin 
absolute distincllon of ki 11d between the mental and lhe physical. Su 
Alfred takes th is as eqmva lent to repudiating any " inner'· life. and like­
wise, as rejecting the C'laim of privacy for certain of one's thOu!!hts and 
feelings. Hence . Sir Alfred appears ro believe rhat it 1s a s1rong poi n t  
aga inst Ryle: if it can be ·
's hown· ·  that a man does have an mner life. 
consisting of thoughts, fee.lings, etc .. which are accordingly private . 
Being inner and private. 1t ts assumed that they must also be mental. 
whatever that might mean. 
I believe this largely misses the point. II is obvmus that Ry le does 
not deny the common d1slincuon betwe en inner and outer� No one does. 
thou�h 1t ts not entirely clear what " mner" means m this context. Again 
Ryle cer tainly does not deny 1he distinction between p1·iv.ate and public. 
That is, he does not deny that a man ·s feehngs are felt by no one but 
himself. whereas certain other of his states. such ;is tre111bhng or per­
spiring. can be observed as easH,v hy others as b,v lumself. These dis· 
rinctions. therefore-namely. tlDse of inner and outer. aud private and 
public-are not questioned. Certainly no one 1s called upon to show tnat 
a man's lhou�bts and feeling� are bolh inner and priv1ue. \.Vhat Ryle does 
deny is that these distinct ions entail snll another: namely, that between 
minds and bodies or. what rea!ly comes to the same thmg. between the 
mental and the physica L 
It does not appear to me that Su Alfred anywhere shows that Ryle is 
w 1ong about th is . That is. t� does not show that the first two distinctions 
do imply the third. Indeed, he does not even address lumself to that ques· 
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t·ion. He simply used a.11 three t.errn� inter-changMhly. thus presupposing 
at leasr. part of the very question at isRue. 
Conl':iider the felt. tweak when one ' s  shoe pinches, (p. 11)_ Now if the 
distinction of inner and oat.er applies here at all, which can be doubled, 
this is an i1111er state. lf one had to locate the felt tweak, he would locate 
it in the foot and not sGmewhere out.side it. He wc.uld never, fot cxampk, 
point r.o I.be head. Further. it is surely a priuale state, 1n the sense that 
i t  can only be felt hy him whose shoe is pinching: it cannot be passed 
around for others to t'eel. the way the shoe it.self, for example . can. 
B11t whal do these terribly obvious facts imply with respect to thf: 
terribly metaphysical and unohvious disl:irtction of body and mind? They 
imply nothing what�ver. It cannot be said, for example ,  that this felt 
tweak, being both inner and private, must be in the mind rath8r than i11 the 
body, for there is nothing in these facts to imply the existence of any 
mind. Again (which amounts to the same thing) it cannot be said that, 
being both inner and private, this tweak must he a mental rather than a 
physical st ate. For there is nothing here to imply any distinction be­
tween mental and phys ical, even if we assume, as is doubtful, that this 
is an intelligible distinction. 
Surely if one were asked to describe his state of mind. he might use 
such words as depressed, euphoric, bored, and so on. He certainly would 
not point to his foot, a.nd say t.hat his shoe pinches, this being about as 
remote from anything a.nyone would call a mental stat.e as anything that 
c:an be imagined . Certainly, if one's foot. hurts, this is a. state of his foot, 
not a state of mind. And a foot is a physical object, perfectly public. 
"Ah yes, the fool is public. but we were talking about a feeliog in 
the foot, namely, that fell. tweak when the shoe is too tight. Thal is not 
something public. That is a private, inner feeling. And therefore not a 
Dhysical state of the foot at all. It. must, accordingly, be something men· 
t.al." 
I believe this last paragraph encapsulates a mode of thinking that 
pervades Sir Alfred's whole discussion, and of course he is not the first 
to fall under its spell. 
To see how inconclusive it is, we need only to see that any state of 
any object is an inner. private state. Consider,  for e:xample, an iron mag­
net .. Its state of being magnetized is a physical state, as surely as any­
thing is phys1cal; for this ouly means it i s  a state of a physical object, 
and a har of iron is a physical object. But where is tbal. state? Is it an 
. . inn e r "  state of the iron, or not? It is doubtful whether this Question 
m"k�� s<msi;;. just as ii is doubtful whether it m"kes s�n�e to a�!\ where 
feelings a.re, but if one had to answe r it, he would probably say it is in 
the iron. Certainly it is not somewhere else. Is it a publicly observable 
state? Of course it is not. Whatever it is about the iron that makes it 
attractive to iron filings is not something t.ha.t: can be seen. felt, or other·­
wise directly observed. We can only inf er that it is in that state by cer-. 
t.ain 1.ests. Is it, then. a state which, like a feeling. can be possessed 
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only by one thing, or can it be transmitted from one bar of iron to another'? 
Here is where it is tertibly important not to get muddled. In one sense 
this state is uniquely possessed by that bar of iron whose state it is. and 
cannot be transmitted to another bar, but in another sense i t  is not unique­
ly possessed, and can be pa.ssecl along 1'ro111 bar to bar. Thus: Ir bar A 
is demagne t.ized, and ba.r B is magnetized, we can only say that the first 
has ceas�d to be magnetized, <tnd the second has become so. There is no 
sense in saying that the second bar now possesses the f:irst. bar's magnet· 
ism, if by this is meant that a state has been passed along intact from 
one thing to another, the way the bar itself might. be passed along int.act 
from. say, one person to anothe r .  As a matter of logic, a state of a. thing 
can only belong to that whose state it is-it cannot acquire new owners. 
This is no metaphysical profundity; it is only u matter of understanding 
the logic of states and propert ies. Now of course there is another sense 
in which bar A can be said to lose its magnetism to bar B, just as one 
object can absorb the heat of another, and so on. But all this means is 
that, under certain familiar conditions, one thing can acquire the state 
previously possessed oy another. e.g.,  the state of being magnetized, 
or warm, or whatnot. In this sense, of course, feelings can be transmitted; 
for one can surely say th.at one man can acquire the 5tate previously 
possessed by another, e . g . ,  the state of being morose, bored, or having 
a headache. To say that one man cannot have another m((n's headache is, 
again, to make no metaphysical point; it is only to call attention to the 
logic of pmperties and states. 
In what sense, then, does the state of magnetism posses�ed, by the 
iron bar, differ from the state of pain, possessed by the man? The cmcial 
dit"f erence seems to be this: that the man can know, without inference, 
that he is in the state , whereas the bar cannot. This, however, ealls 
attention to no difference in kind between the two states . It only calls 
attention to a very obvious difference between a man and a piece of iirnn. 
The rea�on the piece of iron does not know, without. inf crence, that 1t is 
magnetized, is not that t.he magnet.ism is a mere physical state of the iron 
rather than .a spiritual state of its soul. It i s .  rat her, that the piece of iron 
is only a piece of iron, and does not know anything. Sul'ely nothing meta­
physical can be gleaned from that meager fact. 
l think we can concludt'., then, that f Ol' anything S i r  Alfred has said 
to the contrary, the tweak in the foot , when the shoe is too tight, (i) is 
a state of Lhe nerve of u foot , and thus a state of the foot of which that 
nerve i� part. and hence of the man of whicl1 that foot is part; and not a 
state of mind or mental state; (ii) rhat, being a state of a physical object. 
namely, the state of a nerve 01· of a foot or of a nian. it is a physical 
state. thi� being, indeed, the best definition there is of a physical st.ate: 
(iii) that it is not a publicly observable state, but neither, for that matter, 
are many ot.ber purely physic:'11 star.es, such as that of being magnetized: 
(iv) that. it is a private state, in the sense t.hat it cannot. be passed a1ong 
intact from one possessor 1 0  another, though in that 5ense all states are 
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private; and finally (v) that it differs from certain other physical states 
in being knowable by its possessor without inference, which points up a 
difference between certain physical objects, namely, those that can and 
those that cannot know things, but calls attention to no additional differ­
ence between the state of such objects, and in particular to no difference 
that could be marked by the terms "mental" and "physical." 
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